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INTEGRATIVE INFORMATION PLATFORMS: 
THE CASE OF ZERO-RATING 
Olivier Sylvain* 
CITE AS: 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 360 (2018) 
 
 
 Zero-rated services provide an on-ramp to networked resources 
that are otherwise beyond many users’ reach. Through such services, 
wireless service providers offer free access to a curated set of popular 
applications on the public Internet. Its proponents assert that zero-rated 
services provide an invaluable introduction to online applications and 
content, which, in turn, will increase adoption rates in the most neglected 
markets.   
But zero-rating has split communications policymakers around the 
world. Proponents argue that it grows adoption rates.1 Opponents argue 
that it violates the network neutrality norms of nondiscrimination and 
“innovation without permission.”2 Other opponents assert that zero-rating 
dissuades governments from committing resources to alternative ways of 
deploying affordable service universally.3 The issue has been challenging 
for communications scholars to sort through, as it joins a variety of 
arguably incompatible regulatory norms.4 I argue here, instead, that zero-
rating should only be evaluated in the way all communications 
technologies are: how does it enable all members of the community to 
contribute to and engage in public life on equal terms? 
																																								 																				
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
1Arturo J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Zero-Rating, Net-Neutrality, 
and International Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 364, 424–25 (2016); Darrell M. West, 
Digital Divide: Improving Internet Access in the Developing World Through Affordable 
Services and Diverse Content, Ctr. for Tech. Innovation at Brookings, 10–11 (Feb. 2015) 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/West_Internet-Access.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JDB-X2J7]. 
2 Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a 
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like,  67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9, 30 (2015). 
3 See Carolina Rossini & Taylor Moore, Exploring Zero-Rating Challenges: Views From 
Five Countries, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (July 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-
release/public-knowledge-publishes-net-neutrality-paper-investigating-zero-rating-p 
[https://perma.cc/VG8A-GKT7].  
4 See, e.g., Rob Frieden, The Mixed Blessing in Subsidized Internet Access, 15 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 269 (2017); Ellen P. Goodman, Zero-Rating Broadband Data: Equality and 
Free Speech at the Network’s Other Edge, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 63 (2016). 
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There are undoubtedly ways in which zero-rated services present a 
cost-effective opportunity for communities who long to be online. But 
there are reasons to be skeptical about their ability to actually achieve this 
objective. I argue here that regulatory regimes, which permit zero-rating 
are troubling to the extent that they fail to redress disparities in users’ 
engagement of the networked information economy. 
The new attention to zero-rating creates an opportunity to revisit an 
essential aspect of communications law that in recent years appears to 
have been all but forgotten among policymakers and scholars. This essay 
attempts to resuscitate the longstanding but often overlooked objective of 
ensuring universal access to reasonably comparable communications 
services. The idea is simple: the main purpose of communications policy 
(in democracies, at least) is to ensure that all members of the polity have 
the meaningful opportunity to engage in commerce and participate in 
public life—that they have access to the full bazaar of resources on which 
citizenship in the given community is based. The concept is not new. It 
finds its earliest legal expression in the United States in the Postal Clause 
of the Constitution,5 a provision to which Justice Joseph Story devoted 
several sections of his opus on constitutional law. The post office, Justice 
Story explains,  
 
circulates intelligence of a commercial, political, 
intellectual, and private nature, with incredible speed and 
regularity. It thus administers, in a very high degree, to the 
comfort, the interests, and the necessities of persons, in 
every rank and station of life. It brings the most distant 
places and persons, as it were, in contact with each other; 
and thus softens the anxieties, increases the enjoyments, 
and cheers the solitude of millions of hearts. It imparts a 
new influence and impulse to private intercourse; and, by a 
wider diffusion of knowledge, enables political rights and 
duties to be performed with more uniformity and sound 
judgment.6 
 
This conception of communications policy has informed 
telecommunications policy for over a century, even if its implementation 
often redounded to monopoly service providers like AT&T.7 I have argued 
																																								 																				
5 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (Congress has the power “To establish Post Offices and 
post Roads.”). 
6 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3 § 1120. 
7 See TIM WU, MASTER SWITCH (2012); RICHARD JOHN, NETWORK NATION (2010); 
PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS (2005). 
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elsewhere that policymakers should reorient communications to promote 
deontological interests in universality, equality, and social integration.8 
This paper picks up where that last project only gestured in the context of 
zero-rating. I propose here the foundations of a theoretical framework for 
evaluating communications policy outside of its ability to increase rates of 
new user adoption.   
 
I. ZERO-RATING AS A REMEDY FOR ACCESS DISPARITIES 
 
A.   Disparities in Internet Use 
 
The spread of wireless services around the world has helped to 
close the divide between those with access to the Internet and those 
without. But disparities in use persist largely because wireless service is 
generally not as fast, reliable, or immersive as wired connections.9 In the 
United States, for example, African-Americans and Latinos are equally as 
likely to access the Internet as Caucasians; however, the general online 
experiences between these groups are vastly different because the former 
rely on wireless devices at three times the rate at which the latter do.10 
Similar patterns of disparity characterize the nature of online engagement 
between poor people and wealthier people on the one hand, and rural and 
urban residents on the other.11   
Such disparities are even more egregious around the world. Latin 
America has an average of forty-three percent Internet penetration.12 Only 
eighteen percent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa has access to the 
																																								 																				
8 Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 443 (2016). 
9 See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass: A 
Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 INFO. SOC’Y: INT’L J. 323, 326 (2014); see also Eli 
Noam, Let Them Eat Cellphones: Why Mobile Wireless Is No Solution for Broadband, 1 
J. INFO. POL’Y 470 (2011). 
10 Sylvain, supra note 8, at 464–69 (2016); see also Boris Bartikowski et al., The Type-of-
Internet-Access Digital Divide and the Well-Being of Ethnic Minority and Majority 
Consumers: A Multi-Country Investigation, 82 J. BUS. RES. 373, 374, https://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0148296317303260/1-s2.0-S0148296317303260-main.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XD89-58R4] (“Such type-of-internet-access differences are important 
because smartphones, as compared to regular computers, are less suitable for engaging in 
economic value creating online activities, such as brand- or price-comparisons, applying 
for a job, or following an educational program.”). 
11 Sylvain, supra note 8; Bartikowski et al., A Multi-Country Investigation, supra note 10. 
12 Between Latin American states, however, there is significant variation: as of 2011, 
only a few states had more than one-third of their population using information 
communicative technologies, and even wealthy states had only 10 percent internet 
penetration. See Tricia Gray et al., Gender and the Digital Divide in Latin America, 90 
SOC. SCI. Q. 326, 329 (Mar. 2017).  
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Internet.13 And India, despite having “the third-largest Internet user base in 
the world,” has only ten percent Internet penetration, due to lack of access 
in its rural areas.14 Even as Internet access rates increase globally, lack of 
access remains a major issue.15  
 
B.   Redressing Disparity 
 
Policymakers and scholars generally attribute disparities in online 
use to unequal patterns of infrastructure investment and development.16 
Governments accordingly commit public funds or create incentives to 
reverse these inequalities. They have, among other things, directly 
invested in physical fiber-optic and wireless networks. State and local 
governments in the United States have supported the construction of 
citywide broadband networks and facilities, some of which they own or 
co-own and maintain in cooperation with commercial providers. National 
governments, including that of the United States, have provided means-
tested subsidies directly to qualifying “underserved” users and 
communities.17 And, according to recent news reports, policymakers in the 
United States are entertaining a massive billion-dollar investment in next-
generation wireless networks.18   
																																								 																				
13 For example, while 48 percent of the populations of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa 
have internet access, only 9 percent have access in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Tanzania. See 
Fenohasina Maret & Daiki Akiyoshi, Turning Africa’s Digital Divide into Digital 
Dividends, URB. INST. (May 9, 2017), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/turning-africas-
digital-divide-digital-dividends [https://perma.cc/ULZ8-U2S7].  
14 Charu Malhotra, Bridging Digital Divide: Special Emphasis on Rural India, 55 
PRODUCTIVITY 276, 278 (2014).  
15 Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, The State of Broadband: 
Broadband Catalyzing Sustainable Development, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, at 10–13 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/pol/S-POL-BROADBAND.18-2017-
PDF-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VEA-6EN2] (“In practice, it is virtually impossible to 
experience the Internet effectively via a 2G connection. Only 76% of the world’s 
population lives within access of a 3G signal, and only 43% of people have access to a 
4G connection. Thus, the majority of the connected world remains under-connected, most 
of them in developing countries.”). 
16 See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass: 
A Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 INFO. SOC’Y J. 323, 326 (2014). 
17 See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Lifeline Program for Low-Income 
Consumers, https://www.fcc.gov/general/lifeline-program-low-income-consumers 
[https://perma.cc/E243-5EGW].  
18 Katie Collins, Trump Team Mulls Nationalized 5G Network to Counter China, CNET 
(Jan. 29, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/trump-officials-reportedly-
consider-nationalized-5g-network/ [https://perma.cc/2Y8A-HK55]; see also Press 
Release, Chairman Pai Proposes Over $500 Million in Funding to Promote Rural 
Broadband Deployment, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N  (Jan. 16, 2018), 
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Government incentives for commercial investment also come in a 
variety of forms. One prominent view is that providers and application 
developers would invest more in infrastructure and new services if they 
were freed from the burdens of government oversight and enforcement.19 
Proponents of this view believe that a laissez-faire approach to network 
management of residential broadband service, for example, would 
encourage private investment in that sector. This is among the principle 
reasons that Congress last year repealed Obama-era rules that imposed 
privacy restrictions on residential broadband providers’ ability to, among 
other things, collect and monetize subscribers’ web-browsing activity.20   
It is also the reason that the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) recently rescinded robust network neutrality regulations.21 The 
debate over the past decade and a half about network neutrality takes up 
the question of how federal communications regulation might best 
promote investment in state-of-the-art broadband service: should 
policymakers employ a “regulatory light touch” or should they forbid 
providers from blocking or discriminating against unaffiliated content, 
applications and services, or end-user devices. In any event, these rival 
approaches in the network neutrality debate both posit that, whatever the 
right policy approach, it ought to find the right mix of incentives to 
encourage innovation and investment. I have elsewhere called this 
prevailing approach among policymakers the “trickle-down theory of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0116/DOC-
348723A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9PK-8G7N].  
19 See, e.g., Diana Carew, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in Developing 
Countries, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-Internet-
Ecosystems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9A6-VWPJ]. 
20 Brian Fung, Trump Has Signed Repeal of the FCC Privacy Rules. Here’s What 
Happens Next., WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/04/04/trump-has-signed-repeal-of-the-fcc-privacy-rules-heres-what-
happens-next [https://perma.cc/7WJ6-8Z44].  
21 Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC 17-166 (2018), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0223/FCC-17-
166A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX5T-SU93]; see What Is Network Neutrality?, VOX (May 
21, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.vox.com/cards/network-neutrality 
[https://perma.cc/6E8T-4LQU] (“Network neutrality is the idea that Internet service 
providers (ISPs), including cable companies like Time Warner and wireless 
providers like Sprint, should treat all Internet traffic equally. It says your ISP shouldn’t be 
allowed to block or degrade access to certain websites or services, nor should it be 
allowed to set aside a "fast lane" that allows content favored by the ISP to load more 
quickly than the rest.”). 
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innovation.” Under this view, potential users are the down-market “spill-
over” beneficiaries of private investment in applications and services.22 
 
C.   Enter Zero-Rating 
 
Zero-rating is a species of broadband networked service through 
which providers make a curated set of Internet-based applications or 
programs available to subscribers for free. Generally, through zero-rating, 
providers do not count participating subscribers’ use of certain 
applications against subscription data caps. But, in practice, zero-rated 
services come in different forms. A mobile service provider might give 
users free access to a stand-alone application like Wikipedia Zero, the 
crowd-sourced online encyclopedia. Or it might offer dozens of free 
applications through one zero-rated service such as Free Basics, 
Facebook’s zero-rated platform.23   
These services vary in other ways as well.  Some zero-rated 
platforms, like Free Basics, impose technical standards that limit the 
number of eligible applications that may feature among those offered. 
Many zero-rated applications, moreover, are stripped down or limited 
versions of what their developers make available on the public internet to 
conventional paying subscribers. Others, like Wikipedia Zero, are stand-
alone applications that make the “full Wikimedia experience” available to 
users.24 
Policymakers around the world often express enthusiasm about 
zero-rating on the theory that, whether or not the applications are curated 
																																								 																				
22 Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 336–37 
(2012). 
23 Some observers include “sponsored data programs” among “zero-rated” services.  
Through these, content providers and application developers pay mobile carriers to 
provide users access to their services or content for free. See Where We’ve Launched, 
INTERNET.ORG by FACEBOOK, https://info.internet.org/en/story/where-weve-launched 
[https://perma.cc/GK7Q-UEXL]; see also Samantha Bates et al., Zero Rating & Internet 
Adoption: The Role of Telcos, ISPs, & Technology Companies in Expanding Global 
Internet Access, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y RES. PUBL’N (Jan. 2018), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33982356/2017-10_zerorating.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JF6F-YKS2]. 
24 Wikimedia recently ended its zero-rated service, Wikipedia Zero, due to continued 
controversy and minimal use by its intended beneficiaries. See Cory Doctorow, 
Wikipedia Discontinues its "Zero-Rating," Will Focus on Research-Driven Outreach, 
BOINGBOING (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:37 AM), https://boingboing.net/2018/02/19/wikipedia-
discontinues-its-z.html [https://perma.cc/XUU9-BYHP]. Instead, Wikimedia is seeking to 
raise awareness and increase use of its services through community outreach. See 
Zachary McCune, Raising Awareness for Wikipedia in Nigeria, WIKIMEDIA (Sept. 21, 
2017), https://blog.wikimedia.org/2017/09/21/nigeria-wikipedia-awareness/ 
[https://perma.cc/D7UA-ABKQ]. 
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or limited versions of those available on the public internet, simple access 
creates opportunities that do not otherwise exist for education, 
employment, and entrepreneurship. There is some merit to this claim. 
Research has shown that with greater access, historically disadvantaged 
communities are more likely to become active participants in the 
economy.  For example, internet users are generally more productive with 
every incremental increase in broadband speed.25 As I have written 
elsewhere, “even the smallest increases in broadband penetration rates are 
strongly correlated with significant increases in the number of jobs and 
aggregate household income in some areas.”26 This is to say that there is a 
strong correlation between connection quality and a handful of important 
macroeconomic considerations.27 
The debate among entrepreneurs, policymakers, and scholars 
around the world about regulatory regimes that permit zero-rated services 
offers a fresh opportunity to reconsider what government regulation of 
broadband network management ought to look like. How, if at all, should 
regulators control the way in which providers and application developers 
offer zero-rated services?   
Many have welcomed zero-rating services, arguing that they are 
cost-effective ways of introducing members of underserved communities 
to the online experience.28 Investment in wired, land-based infrastructure 
is notoriously expensive; its high fixed-costs of development make 
providers and many governments tentative about investment. Traditional 
land-based telecommunications service, moreover, tends to be heavily 
regulated in most places around the world, largely because it encumbers 
local public and private land and other assets. This acts as further 
disincentive to private investment.   
Policies that allow or encourage zero-rating services, proponents 
argue, directly confront the incentive problem. Regulations that allow 
																																								 																				
25 MICHAEL MINGES, WORLD BANK, Background Paper: Exploring the Relationship 
Between Broadband and Economic Growth 11 (Jan. 2015), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/391452529895999/WDR16-BP-Exploring-the-
Relationship-between-Broadband-and-Economic-Growth-Minges.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NTM5-DBKE].  
26 Broadband’s Economic Impact in Michigan, CONNECT MICHIGAN (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.connectmi.org/sites/default/files/connected-
nation/Michigan/files/mi_economic_impact_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AKY-4W6N].  
27 Cf. Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 359, 390 (2007); Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New 
“Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for 
Communications Policy, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217, 263 (2009). 
28 Mark Zuckerberg, Free Basics Protects Net Neutrality, TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 28, 
2015), http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/free-basics-protects-net-
neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/5658-4D7U]. 
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providers and application developers to experiment with zero-rating 
services could trigger investment in network infrastructure for underserved 
communities for at least two reasons. First, the anticipated increases in 
online participation will create an incentive to invest in infrastructure to 
support the service. Second, providers and application developers will be 
more likely to offer zero-rated services and platforms on the knowledge 
that they, as the first among their rivals to enter the market on zero-rating 
terms, will effectively be the powerful gatekeepers (the proverbial “on-
ramp”) to network services for new users. In this loss-leader position, 
providers and developers will collect fees and other material benefits from 
entrepreneurs who want to reach new users.  They also will collect 
valuable data about users. The latter is particularly tantalizing for 
companies who have their sights on emerging markets in China, India, and 
Brazil. Developers of online services today covet user data, the currency 
of the networked information economy.     
While there is great promise in zero-rating services in their 
potential to bring users online, there are good reasons to be skeptical.  If 
allowed, zero-rated services give a significant competitive advantage to 
powerful providers and application developers who are eager to expand 
their reach and collect valuable user data. Regulators around the world 
also might be concerned about the way in which the vertical integration of 
transmission service with applications raises the threat of anticompetitive 
behavior. They might also be worried about the ways in which internet 
companies monetize user data in ancillary or secondary markets, with little 
benefit to those users.29   
Today, regulators generally turn to communications law, not 
antitrust or consumer data protection, to evaluate zero-rated services. 
Specifically, they assess whether the given zero-rated service is consistent 
with network neutrality regulations that forbid providers from privileging 
affiliated content or applications over others.30 The argument is that zero-
rating impedes innovation and free speech online by giving an advantage 
to some content and applications irrespective of consumer demand—that 
providers are effectively picking winners and losers not necessarily with 
regard to user interest.31   
																																								 																				
29 Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203 (2018). 
30 See, e.g., Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, TRAI releases Recommendations on 
“Net Neutrality”, Press Release No. 100/2017 (Nov. 11, 2017), 
http://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR_No.100of2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/63T3-N9DC]; 
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15–24, 151–52 (Mar. 12, 2015). 
31 A counterpoint is that these concerns are less relevant in competitive markets.  Because 
developing countries have highly competitive markets, one report writes, “[a]s long as 
regulators mandate the publishing of operators’ traffic-management practices and ban 
negative discrimination of non-zero-rated traffic, market mechanisms can be sufficient to 
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Indeed, it is chiefly on these grounds that several regulators around 
the world have forbidden the practice. In 2014, for example, the 
Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) published an article 
stating that zero-rating programs would constitute a clear violation of its 
network neutrality guidelines.32  “[Z]ero-rating lead[s] to selected traffic 
from the Internet service provider itself or affiliated providers being 
favored above other traffic. And this is exactly the kind of situation net 
neutrality aims to avoid.”33  The Norwegian parliament formally adopted 
net neutrality provisions in 2017, substituting binding law for Nkom’s 
voluntary agreement with stakeholders.34   
Chile, for its part, added network neutrality provisions to its 
General Telecommunications Law in 2010, and its communications 
regulator, Subtel, officially outlawed zero-rating practices in 2014 for 
violating these provisions.35 Despite a significant digital divide and the 
popularity of “Free Social Media” mobile plans in Chile at the time, the 
country’s commitment to net neutrality principles required consideration 
of the potential long-term anticompetitive effects of such plans.36 
In 2016, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) 
published additional net neutrality rules that prohibited zero-rating 
practices.37 This ruling was the culmination of months of conflict between 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
prevent the most egregious harms.” See Helani Galpaya, Zero-Rating in Emerging 
Economies, GLOBAL COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1 (2017), 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/GCIG%20no.47_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WTD6-RA5H]. 
32 Frode Sørensen, Net Neutrality and Charging Models, NORWEGIAN COMM’N 
AUTHORITY (Nov. 18, 2014), https://eng.nkom.no/topical-issues/news/net-neutrality-and-
charging-models [https://perma.cc/U3LF-86K7]. 
33 Id. 
34 Nkom also acknowledges the Norwegian adoption of Regulation 2015/2120, which 
establishes European rules of net neutrality, but notes that the Regulation lacks clarity as 
to its zero-rating policy. See Net Neutrality in Norway, NORWEGIAN COMM’N 
AUTHORITY (Aug. 18, 2017), https://eng.nkom.no/technical/internet/net-neutrality/net-
neutrality-in-norway [https://perma.cc/6TZX-GY5G].   
35 Lauren Walker, How Is Net Neutrality Working for the Countries that Have It?, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/how-net-neutrality-working-
countries-have-it-269632 [https://perma.cc/RN3N-PFWG]. 
36 See Daniel Lyons, In Chile, Net Neutrality Widens the Digital Divide, AEI (June 2, 
2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/chile-net-neutrality-widens-digital-
divide/ [https://perma.cc/6MRK-ECPU]; see also David Meyer, In Chile, Mobile 
Carriers Can No Longer Offer Free Twitter, Facebook or WhatsApp, GIGAOM (May 28, 
2014, 3:28 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/05/28/in-chile-mobile-carriers-can-no-longer-
offer-free-twitter-facebook-and-whatsapp/ [https://perma.cc/KS8X-YYMH]. 
37 Ingrid Lunden, India Blocks Facebook’s Free Basics, Other Zero-Rated Mobile 
Services Over Net Neutrality, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/08/india-blocks-facebook-freebasics-net-neutrality/ 
[https://perma.cc/UX3L-5EY7]. 
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the TRAI and zero-rating services, specifically Facebook’s Free Basics, 
and immense public support for net neutrality.38 In late 2017, TRAI 
published additional recommendations that would forbid data speed 
throttling, leading the BBC to suggest that India may have the world’s 
strongest net neutrality rules.39 The TRAI chairman explained, “The 
overarching thought that we had was for a country like India, [is that the] 
internet is an extremely important platform. . . .  [I]t is important that this 
platform be kept open and free and not cannibalized.”40 
Regulators in the United States have vacillated on the question.  In 
2015, the FCC declined to categorically prohibit zero-rating practices in 
its “Open Internet Order.”41 Acknowledging that such plans had the 
potential to either benefit or harm consumers and competition, it elected to 
assess these practices on a case-by-case basis,42 and the Commission 
informed four internet providers that it would begin an investigation into 
such practices.43 In 2016, Commission staff prepared a report44 
establishing a framework for evaluating zero-rating plans.45 The report 
found that two programs, one offered by AT&T and the other by Verizon, 
“present significant risks to consumers and competition.”46 However, the 
agency terminated its investigations under the new Republican 
																																								 																				
38 Id. 
39 Prasanto K. Roy, India Net Neutrality Rules Could Be World's Strongest, BBC (Nov. 
30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42162979 
[https://perma.cc/YR92-MG66]. 
40 Ananya Bhattacharya, India Is Upholding an Open Internet as the US Moves to 
Dismantle Net Neutrality, QUARTZ (Nov. 29, 2017), https://qz.com/1140558/net-
neutrality-indias-trai-is-upholding-an-open-internet-as-the-fcc-moves-to-dismantle-it-in-
the-us/ [https://perma.cc/4UNC-7SQE]. 
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administration’s Chairman, Ajit Pai, who observed that “[t]hese free-data 
plans [under investigation] have proven to be popular among consumers, 
particularly low-income Americans, and have enhanced competition in the 
wireless marketplace.”47 The FCC later reversed the net neutrality 
guidelines that animated its zero-rating concerns with the implementation 
of the “Restoring Internet Freedom Order.”48 
 
II.  TOWARDS INTEGRATIVE INFORMATION PLATFORMS 
 
A. Beyond Adoption 
 
The rival approaches in the contemporary policy debate about 
network neutrality tend to abide by the same metrics that pervade so much 
communications policymaking today—focusing on whether a given 
intervention promotes user adoption, innovation, or investment in 
infrastructure. But, while such approaches are useful, they only partially 
account for the ways in which any given policy intervention ensures that 
all people are benefiting from the wide range of online resources.   
Consider an example from outside of the heartland of 
communications policy: high-frequency trading (HFT). I described the 
phenomenon elsewhere in the following way: 
 
Highly leveraged HFT firms design computer programs to 
execute high volume trades by the millisecond in order to 
achieve the firms’ respective investment strategies. By 
doing so, the firms expect to gain a quantifiable advantage 
over competitors. The idea is that, even if any single trade 
yields an infinitesimally small margin of profit, in the 
aggregate, such efforts can prove profitable in even the 
most stable sectors of the economy.49 
 
On the one hand, regulators around the world have expressed 
enthusiasm about HFT because it arguably introduces more efficiency and 
liquidity to markets.50 Others, however, worry about arbitrage, market 
manipulation, and general volatility.51   
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A further critique of the phenomenon is more intuitive and 
addresses the concern emphasized here:  HFT is unfair to individual 
investors who cannot afford the sophisticated computers and software that 
enable such trades. That is, even if we assume that the craftiest or nimblest 
companies should thrive in competitive markets, there is also something 
glaringly unfair about a regulatory regime that makes it difficult for 
ordinary, non-institutional investors to keep up with firms that can afford 
HFT software.   
It is that unfairness that I seek to elaborate on here, but in the 
context of zero-rating. Proposals for laws that permit or encourage zero-
rating are unfair to the extent that they perpetuate structural inequalities 
that prevail in public life generally. Over time, there is, to put the point in 
slightly more concrete terms, a cumulative disadvantage in using inferior 
networked services while others have access to state-of-the-art or even 
conventional applications.52 To be sure, as a phenomenon, zero-rating is 
different from HFT in a at least one notable way. The latter gives investors 
with the wherewithal an advantage over those without it; it widens the gap 
between those with the technology and those without.  Zero-rating 
services meanwhile do not accelerate subscribers’ connections to create a 
competitive advantage over those who do not subscribe to such services. 
Rather, they provide basic service where there was ostensibly none before, 
narrowing but not erasing the disadvantage between those with high-
quality service already and those with just zero-rated service (never mind 
for a moment those without any networked access). This suggests that 
zero-rating may be useful in increasing adoption rates.  But it also is very 
weak medicine for redressing disparity. This is especially true if, as 
studies suggest, the vast majority of users would prefer having a zero-rated 
free plan valid for a short time or with a data cap, with no restriction on 
the websites and applications that can be accessed.”53 Policymakers will 
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need to implement far more dramatic reforms if they are to ensure that all 
users benefit from networked resources in ways that erase disadvantage.   
 
B. Communications Law and the Infrastructure of Citizenship 
 
Underlying my critique here is the assumption that 
communications policy can and should be radically redistributive. This is 
particularly true for a transformative general use technology like the 
internet, which affords access to a wide range of resources. My claim 
seizes on the insight, associated generally with republican speech theory, 
that communications law defines the metes and bounds of the community 
it regulates; it sets the terms by which people communicate and interact 
with each other.   
Communications law either engenders or diminishes members’ 
sense of inclusion.54 Shared or public communications infrastructure is the 
foundation on which civic learning and social integration occur. This is 
because communicative acts do more than convey discrete concepts or 
articulate commercial transactions. They comprise the expressions and 
language of contemporary public life.55  This is how communications 
policy determines citizenship. It does so, not so much in the technical 
ways by which immigration laws or naturalization processes do, but by 
structuring people’s interaction with the cultural content of citizenship. In 
this way, communication policymakers might also make integration far 
harder for certain members of the community if networked 
communications resources are unequally distributed.     
The great promise of the internet at the time of its commercial 
deployment over twenty years ago was that anyone with access could have 
something to offer, no matter their socioeconomic status, geographic 
location, or demographic characteristics. The Internet was thought to be 
comprised of a “great and gathering conversation” in which every willing 
user could join, free from offline biases or overbearing government 
content regulation.56 But policies that permit zero-rating categorically 
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violate this foundational concept insofar as they allow for the exclusion of 
underserved populations from the wide range of content and services 
online. They effectively perpetuate the uneven distribution of resources for 
communication and learning. This is one way, then, that just as 
communications policy might promote integration, it might also make it 
difficult for members of historically subordinated groups to participate in 
online activity in the same way that others can. The challenge for 
policymakers is to strike the right balance in, on the one hand, promoting 
expression but, just as importantly, encouraging opportunities for 
inclusion. 
By adopting the conception that I sketch in this essay, 
policymakers would move away from thinking only about mechanisms 
that support the distribution of basic zero-rated content and information 
resources. Rather, the approach I propose posits that communications 
policymakers should take as their priority the integration of all community 
members into the full bazaar of information and content available online. 
Metrics of sustained growth in engagement would be one way to measure 
the success of a given communications policy intervention. But, more than 
this, the concept I argue for here starts from the intuition that opportunities 
for social integration are most robust when communications infrastructure 
is freely available to everyone on equal terms.  
  
C. Evaluating Integrative Information Platforms 
 
The stakes could not be higher for members of historically 
subordinated or underserved groups. For them, their inclination or ability 
to participate in public life generally turns on the ways in which law 
defines the terms of civic engagement or commercial participation. This 
insight underscores the essential role communications policymaking plays 
in shaping public life. But, as I suggest above, it is not new. It nevertheless 
remains underdeveloped in ongoing debates about communications policy 
in general and zero-rating in particular.57   
Pursuant to the conception I advocate here, policymakers might 
suspect that zero-rating is a good idea to the extent it promotes 
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applications that keep users apprised of political affairs. Or they might 
require that zero-rating be applied to services that promote health and 
wellbeing for underserved communities. But such approaches are far more 
modest than they should be, at least because they discount the ways in 
which community members might engage the full bazaar of networked 
applications and services that facilitate learning, commerce, syncretic 
cultural forms, civic engagement, and more inchoate opportunities for 
social integration.58 Instead, the driving assumption should be that all 
members have the potential to learn and contribute to the “great and 
gathering conversation”—and that they can only do so when they are 
engaged on reasonably comparable terms with all other members of the 
community. So, apart from focusing on whether communications policy 
increases adoption rates, policymakers could set their sights instead on the 
question of whether and how zero-rating could enable its subscribers to 
participate as fully in the public life of the community as all other users. It 
is on this basis that I sketch here an alternative framework of evaluating 
zero-rating services. 
Even if we assume that zero-rated services bring new users online, 
policymakers should still want to know the extent to which new 
subscribers are integrated into the networked world. If, for example, users 
can engage internet applications and services in ways that are reasonably 
comparable to others, then zero-rating might very well help universalize 
internet access. It would suggest a way forward for policymakers who, 
through several public law mechanisms, could incentivize providers and 
application developers to expand zero-rated services.  
Many zero-rated services, however, offer nothing more than a 
limited introductory online experience that does not take users beyond the 
“on-ramp.” Indeed, it appears that many subscribers around the world 
subscribe to zero-rated services as a temporary stopgap when, in any given 
month or pay period, their usage exceeds data caps. 59 Users who already 
have Internet access apparently often combine paid and zero-rated services 
to suit their connectivity needs.60 Such usage patterns would not be a 
																																								 																				
58 We might associate such policies with the “capabilities” approach to sustainable 
development.  See, e.g., The Internet and Sustainable Development, INTERNET SOC’Y 
(June 2015), https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2015/the-internet-and-
sustainable-development/ [https://perma.cc/78K3-GSTP].   
59 See, e.g., Toshiya Jitsuzumi, Zero-Rating and Net Neutrality in the Mobile Market: The 
Case of Japan (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3138491 [https://perma.cc/4GBY-
BNKV]. 
60 Alliance for Affordable Internet, The Impacts of Emerging Mobile Data Services in 
Developing Countries, at 3 (2016), 
http://1e8q3q16vyc81g8l3h3md6q5f5e.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 375 
success under the framework I propose here. Indeed, we should be 
skeptical of any service if it does not grow sustained interest among new 
subscribers. It would not be enough that users from time to time subscribe 
to zero-rated service.     
Considering this, the alternative I propose here does not weigh a 
network service’s success based on adoption rates. Instead, I propose 
policymakers assess whether networked information services generate 
sustainable growth in online engagement by unique users. Under the 
approach I propose here, new users would invariably be afforded the same 
or reasonably comparable access to the full bazaar of networked resources 
on the internet as all other users. That is, they would be able to learn from, 
interact with, and contribute to all networked resources in ways that all 
retail internet users can.  At a minimum, only under such conditions would 
policymakers receive data or feedback on whether simple access to zero-
rated services justifies governmental support.  
Providers, application developers, and new users have a lot to gain 
from regulatory regimes that permit or promote zero-rating. But local 
application developers, too, might benefit to the extent they can partner 
with wireless providers or zero-rated platform developers. When deployed 
in unserved or underserved communities, zero-rating might create 
commercial opportunities for local entrepreneurs that did not exist before. 
For example, the administrators of Free Basics, the Facebook platform for 
zero-rated applications, could be particularly interested in cultivating 
locally generated applications or content that reflect local, cultural 
priorities and commercial opportunities. Of course, providers and 
developers might choose to replicate the same suite of applications and 
content around the world, irrespective of the local, cultural sensibilities in 
which they offer their service. One could imagine that such an approach 
would be more cost-effective insofar as the costs of scaling up or 
replicating are far lower than the aggregated expense of production and 
development for each community. On the other hand, national 
policymakers might make the production of local content a condition of 
providing the service. We should expect that, properly imposed, such a 
condition would influence the character of online offerings and increase 
local engagement of networked resources. And, in so doing, 
communications policy would come far closer to achieving its core 
democracy-enhancing objectives. 
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